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Abstract Under the influence of Hilary Putnam’s collapse of the fact/value
dichotomy, a resurging approach that challenges the movements of American
pragmatism and discourse ethics, I tease out in the first section of my paper the
demand for the warranted assertibility hypothesis in Putnam’s sense that may
be possible, relying on moral realism to get rid of ‘rampant Platonism’. Tracing
back to ‘communicative action’ or the Habermasian way that puts forward the
reciprocal understanding of discourse instigates the idea of life-world as com-
posed of ‘culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpreta-
tive patterns’, this section looks for whether Habermas’ psychoanalysis of
prolonged discussion can accord with Putnam’s thick ethical terms or not.
The last section of the paper pitfalls Putnam’s stance to accepting Habermas’
‘discourse ethics’ that centers around the context of entangling ‘rational
thoughts’ to ‘communication’, but he introduces the idea of fallibilism in a
rational query that also attacks the Habermasian metaphysical idea of the
validity of ethical statements that goes towards the truth. My next attempt is
to see whether Putnam’s objective dictum towards morality that resonates the
collapse of fact/value dichotomy from a universalistic stand can successfully
evade Rorty’s naive realism (structured by linguistic representation) and
Habermas’ ‘sociologism about values’ (a kind of minimalist ethics depending
on solidarity) respectively. This sort of claim insists on a universalizable pattern
of culture-relative value. I consider that the idea of a fact/value dichotomy
engages with the inextricable entanglement between the normative and descrip-
tive content, besides the epistemic values having exclusively intertwined with
the structure of factual discourse that intends towards collapsing the fact/value
dichotomy, a subjective universalizability predilection.
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The problem that worried me until now is apparently the ‘Hobbesean way’1 to look on
the dichotomy between moral values and legal values. The dichotomy problematizes
the concept of valuation by supposing whether it may be made or discovered. We can
consider in a rationalistic way that values are there in the third realm, and that the agents
discover them consequently. The claim that an empiricist can raise against the humil-
iation of the armchair psychology of a priority (a view that offers that values are located
in the third realm as independent of human knowledge), seems close to some ‘factual
assumptions’. Pragmatists consider, values are certainly ‘fact centric’ that is injected by
the agents and is followed by others. So, the man made process of values has some
experimentation mode that concerns about the good and bad of human life according to
the situations, etc. This debate leads to another ongoing debate, the fact/value dichot-
omy, which is my main concern of the paper. The empiricists and pragmatists are on the
same page regarding the thought that there is no dichotomy between facts and values.
Rorty’s study on his idol, John Dewey hints values as a ‘factual knowledge’, but Rorty
does not hold up Dewey’s ‘objective realism’ in his writing. The reason concentrates on
the problem of the reference of the objective reality. Rorty strongly believes in the
insufficient mode of the objective reality like William James,2 as no subject can stand
the outside of their skin. Later rejecting the idea of objectivity by supporting ‘solidar-
ity’, Rorty mainly draws his attention on the idea of the ‘intrinsic nature’ that differs
from the notion of ‘the thing in themselves’ (Putnam 2002: 99). I think that a sort of
metaphysical realism that Rorty resists can make a room for a subjective point of view.
I firmly believe that it would be littered to reject the metaphysical interaction of the
objectivity along with the idea that people may well have thoughts and beliefs that are
associated with the objectivity or the external world. An agent’s thoughts and beliefs
are not in any sense mere intentional objects (intrinsic way) that are not related to the
objectivity. The demand of subjective standards can be feasible only if we believe in the
process of ‘commonsense realism’, otherwise subjective standard would be an abstract
idea that discards any kind of reality. So my point is that we cannot deduct reality from
our conceptual scheme.
Let me clarify first the sense organs that detect values from the facts, as if we can
outlying red with blue through our sense organs (i.e. eyes). It seems that a person
who has color perception acquires the ability to differentiate between two colors.
Therefore, in a Kantian way, we can say that perception is a spontaneous exercise of
concepts. If we agree with the empiricists, then we need to accept that values cannot
1 Actually, for Hobbes, there is a very faint distinction we may draw between the moral and legal values, but it
is true that the position that culminates a distinction between them is doubtlessly the idea of ‘defenders’, viz.,
the legal values have the propensity that can continue the defenders in the question of justice and injustice as
ordered by the sovereign, whereas the defenders cannot continue his/her defence regarding the right or wrong
of their perspective on moral values as it have no interrogate connection to the sovereign’s proclamations. I
assume that the legal values are more objective that have the stability stand, but moral values are more subjects
centric, so it may be changeable according to the situation.
2 William James thinks, ‘In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We add, both to the
subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really mallable, waiting to receive its final touches
at our hand... Man engenders truths upon it.’ (James 1981: 115)
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be detected by the special sense organs, or in short, it cannot be perceptible, as
perception is a method that is value neutral. Actually, perception deals with reason
that has some factual base utilities. But values are concerned about wills, which have
an intention or emotion base utility. It seems more interesting for me to relook at the
pragmatist account that emphasizes perceptual experience is screaming with values
or in a word perceptual experiences as value-laden. In the case of experiencing the
taste of foods, here the value of good or bad is always associated with the taste of the
objects (i.e. fact). The conception of objective value has some descriptive tendencies
that facilitate the agent to criticise the process of valuation; valuation is a method that
cannot be separable from our human activities. Believing in this idea leads a
philosopher to foresee that human intelligence preserves moral human action. This
conception of human intelligence that makes our communicative action more suc-
cessful goes towards Habermas’ Discourse Ethics that is the second important point
I would like to analyse critically in this paper.
Before entering into the field of Discourse Ethics from Habermas’ stance, I would
like to make clear Hilary Putnam’s standpoint on the warranted assertibility hypoth-
esis. Putnam believes:
The correct formulation of Binternal realism^ is: truth is idealized warranted
acceptability (i.e conformability by our sense data under epistemically ideal
conditions). If language users had not existed, then conditions would not have
been epistemically ideal, but that does not mean the above counterfactual (about
the dinosaurs) would have been true; the counterfactual would have had a true
instead of a false antecedent, but it would still be false.3
Putnam clarifies the conception of the warranted assertibiity is principally concerned
about the objective truth in ethics. So, if we negotiate objectivity of ethics, then the
warranted assertibility does not play any significant role. The contribution of warrant-
ed assertibility in the sense of early Putnam (Putnam as internal realist) attempts to
connect truth under the ideal condition that sounds good enough. It is true that there are
some cases where truth transcends the warranted assertibility under some ideal condi-
tions in the sense of verifications like the ‘statements about the cosmological universe’
or ‘the impossibility to determine truth’ in the case of Brain in a vat’. Putnam cautions
about some exceptions and says:
But in the same way, I argue, there is no reason to suppose that one cannot be
what is called a Bmoral realist^ in meta-ethics, that is, holds that some Bvalue
judgements^ are true as a matter of objective fact, without holding that moral
facts are or can be recognition transcendent facts. If something is a good solution
to a problematical human situation, then part of the very notion of its being a
good solution is that human beings can recognize that it is. We need not entertain
the idea that something could be a good solution, although human beings are in
principle unable to recognize that it is. That sort of rampant Platonism is
incoherent. (Putnam 2002: 108–109)
3 I am personally thankful to my mentor Hilary Putnam for this valuable comment.
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The mentioned quote indicates Putnam’s indisposition to admit the ‘rampant Plato-
nism,’ as he is reluctant to put the absoluteness of moral truth in the third realm that is
beyond of any subjective/objective justification. Putnam seems to have an interest in
seeing language as a game or use that was once propounded by Wittgenstein. Here
inventing some new concepts and construing the general use of the concepts in society
and science, one has to admit that moral truths are not situated out of the world, as the
concepts are, in Putnam’s words, always subject to criticism. So, following Dewey, a
suggestive note can be drawn is that there may be some judgements where something is
valuable without being the experience of the kind of valuing. The reason is that it
undermines the principle of fallibilism, a controversial issue that inspires the way to
insinuate a distinction between the warranted and unwarranted value judgements
without putting them into the domain of transcendent truth.
Austin’s model of truth emerges from the fact of the world where truth does not
sound as a property rather an ‘immanent truth’ i.e. truth is a part of total corpus
related to the reference of the words. Putnam considers that a term refers to an
object only if there is a causal linkage (without any accidental or magical reference)
that encompass between the object and the particular word. Putnam hinges a
problem of traditional realism to ensure that the world cannot be a fixed totality
of objects (the realist’s myth of readymade world) given independently of the
human mind. He intends to devoid any correspondence relation between truth and
the state of affairs from a mind independent level. Truth for him is the warranted
assetibility of the sentence rather than correspondence between the sentence and a
fact. It looks interesting when he replies to Blackburn, ‘It is we who divide up ‘the
world’- that is, the events, state of affairs, and physical, social etc., systems that we
talk about- into ‘objects’, ‘properties’, and ‘relation’, and we do this in variety of
ways. ‘Object’, ‘entity’, ‘property’, (and ‘relation’) have not one fixed use but an
ever-expanding open family of uses. Because ‘exist’ and ‘entity’ are conceptually
linked, the same is true of ‘exist’.’ (Putnam 1995: 243).
1 What Does Communicative Action Say?
Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) puts forward his notable idea
of communicative action by distinguishing it from the strategic and instrumental action.
While strategic action relates to the social world, instrumental action relates mainly to
the non-social world. However, communicative action focuses on how reciprocal
understanding among two persons (or more) is possible in a social world. Brian
Douglas quotes from Habermas,
The concept of communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two
subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations
(whether by verbals or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an
understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to
coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpreta-
tion refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situations which
admit of consensus… Language is given a prominent place in this model.
(Douglas 2009)
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The primordial question is here how does this communicative action go on? And the
answer we find out in Habermas’ work is that it can be possible by the ‘performative
mode of action,’ where an individual understands the norms and reasons of a claim
made by the other partner in a communicating act. The other partner might also provide
the series of reasons in order to challenge the claim made by the first partner, with an
aim to make the whole of discourse free from the domination of power and subjugation.
Hence, what counts in a free discourse is reasoning. In such a procedure, both the
partners engage themselves in communicative action by providing better argumenta-
tions on properly structured reasoned grounds. Discourse begins when one partner
starts challenging the validity claims of the other partner through some rational
argumentations. The process of discourse has some conditions that need to be fulfilled.
All the participants who are involved here express their consultation while attaining any
decision and the participants in turn, must be serious presenting arguments on the
rational grounds. This leads to avoidance of manipulations and violence of any kind in
a healthy systematic and integrated society.
One of the significant aspects that must be taken into consideration in dealing with
Habermas’ communicative action is that the communication among the participants
takes place only in a ‘lifeworld’, in which we are located. Three components are crucial
in a ‘lifeworld’ – society, culture and personality. The ‘lifeworld’ is reproduced through
communicative action and it changes over time. A system is not reproduced through
communicative action and reason. The systems are governed initially by market, power
and money, and there is significantly no space for mutual understanding. Habermas
does not completely withdraw the significance of the systems, because he never says
that without any system, it is possible for a society to assimilate itself and run smoothly.
However, what he asserts is frequently called ‘lifeworld’, which opens up the prospect
of intersubjective communication from domination, power and subjugation. Habermas
says that in a ‘lifeworld’, through communicative action, culture is reproduced, society
is integrated, and personality is socialized. In Habermas’ words:
Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action
serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of coordinat-
ing action, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally,
under the aspect of socialization, communicative action serves the formation of
personal identities… Corresponding to these processes of cultural reproduction,
social integration and socialization are the structural components of the life
world: culture, society, person. (Habermas 1987: 137)
In a society, ‘lifeworld’ enables us to view things from a subjective standpoint; on the
other hand, the systems perspective takes everything from an objective standpoint.
‘Lifeworld’ refers to the inescapable reality of a person that encounters while being
encircled in a number of social phenomena. Habermas thinks that ‘lifeworld’ is
composed of ‘culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretative
patterns’, ‘lifeworld’ finds its expression in texts, and various culturally constructed
artefacts, and through cultural groups. It sounds true that Habermas undertakes his task
of framing the communicative action as a move from particularity to universality, but at
the same time, he is equally sensitive to the impossibilities faced by individuals in
stepping beyond the societal frame world in which they are situated or beyond the
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‘lifeworld’ situation, which entangles them. Communicative action takes the assist of
dialogue and integrates them, shapes them in the way, so that certain human constraints
relating to language (being biased in thoughts, particularism etc.) can be overtaken; and
in its place, a shared understanding can prosper. Habermas says, ‘this process of
communication has a strong potential to Bprevent citizens from acting as isolated
monads on the basis of their own self interests^’ (Habermas 1987: 52). Habermas’
project is a step to realize a common identity among all men overruling all regional/
national boundaries, and promoting shared beliefs, mutual trust, love, faith etc.
2 Putnam on Habermas’ ‘Discourse Ethics’
In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant fairly introduces the idea of objectivity in his
epistemology by bringing the conception of the universal as a necessary condition,
which constitutes all the objects in relation to its syntactic power. One alternative that
Putnam focuses on his writing talks about a pragmatic alternative of the objective
judgement, a stance of ‘intersubjective’ point of view that derives from a historical
background by considering the ethical ideals of rightness and wrongness in terms of the
speakers and the hearers’ communications. So, the Kantian ideas of objectivity, in the
sense of the universal, descend in the procedure of conversation chiefly based on the
dialogical communication with others. Objectivity turns here as an ethical quality of the
communicating.
In the startling work The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2 (1987),
Habermas, in defence of his magnificent prolegma ‘discourse ethics’, has taken
two revolutionary stances. The first one is obviously the distinction between values
and norms. In addition, the second one is, unquestionably, the idea of
Bcommunicative action^. The norm, a sort of valid statement of obligation, which
is associated to universality, rests on the discourse ethics concerning the rational
thought and communicative action together; whereas values are regarded as the
social products that have a naturalistic outlook and vary with different ‘lifeworlds’.
However, while it is true that Habermas’ way of considering norms treats the
Kantian idea of norms in a different angle, we may treat, in tune with Kant’s ethics,
the Habermasian norm that is allied to the communicative actions, as both of them
believe that we need to treat others not as a means, but as an end. Now, I would like
to relook at the Habermasian term ‘communicative action’ that is actually bestowed
on the communicative procedures in an ideal rational discourse by bringing the idea
of the norm of sincerity etc. that are discarded from manipulation. It seems difficult
to claim that the universal norms are more fitted with the communicative action.
Putnam argues:
It cannot be the case that the only universally valid norm refers solely to
Discourse. It is, after all, possible for anyone to recognize truth-telling as a
binding norm, while otherwise, being guided solely by Benlightened
egotism^…, after all, communicative action is contrasted with manipulation,
and as such a person can manipulate people without violating the maxims of
Bsincerity, truth-telling, and saying only what one believes to be rationally
warranted.^ (Putnam 2002: 114–115)
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One can resist that in such a case as if an agent would like to kill another; here it need
not violate any maxim that is interrelated to the ‘discourse ethics’. But Putnam rejects
this unfair criticism to remind that Habermas had a positive belief in Kant’s categorical
imperative. He solely accepts the maxim that one should treat others as an end and not
as a means. Habermas also thinks that people have disagreements about values and
norms, and the disagreement about the ethical value is obviously a significant fact of
life that searches for a middle way. Therefore, Habermas abhors considering any final
ethical systems or rules of conduct. Putnam calls Habermas as a ‘minimalist Kantian
moral philosopher’ who sets a ‘final court of appeal’ that depends on ‘ideal speech
situation’ by discarding it from the mere rules as to how to conduct in the case of
disagreements.
3 Putnam-Habermas
Christine Korsgaard, an eminent Kantian tries to refute the dichotomy between
norms and values portrayed by Habermas. In her splendid book, The Sources of
Normativity (1996), she intends to set up that values are not in any way the object
on which we incline. Even it is not something like ‘initial psychological impulses’
that is governed in the case of valuation. For Korsgaard, the processes are main-
tained by an adaptation of maxims that inspire us to afford value, and not to value
this. Korsgaard considers, ‘I argue for the conclusion that human beings must see
ourselves as value-conferring and must therefore value humanity as an end in itself.’
(Korsgaard 1998: 60–61).
The problem that Putnam finds in Korsgaard’s thought is the universalizing pattern
of maxims and laws that are imposed upon the subject by containing value terms as
contrasted to thick ethical terms like kind, cruel etc. The thick ethical terms are
associated with the ‘ethical maxims’ hardly can transit it into the ‘universal laws’, as
the extensions of the thick ethical terms are, according to Putnam, universally
unintelligible.
Putnam argues against Habermas’ discourse ethics by introducing an example. Let
us think that there is a thick ethical word like ‘chastity’ in X’s (subject) Bsocial world^,
but it may be lacking in Y’s (others) Bsocial world^. If X follows a norm that BAvoid
unchaste behavior^, then this norm makes no sense to Yas in their Bsocial world^ there
is no relevant extension of the thick ethical terms. One can discuss and continue their
discussion regarding some norms or concepts only if both have some minimal account
of knowledge about the concepts and others that are related to the concepts. Putnam
thinks:
The problem this poses for discourse ethics is that discussion (as opposed to
negotiation) presupposes that the question at issue is cognitively meaningful. If
we suppose it is not, as Ramsey remarked, such a Bdiscussion^ Bconsists in A
saying he would feel guilty if he weren’t constant, B saying he wouldn’t feel
guilty in the least^. (Putnam 2002: 121)
Until the discussion can find out some good reason, it would lead to continuing
conversions where it would be tricky to conceive a common vocabulary or common
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understanding from a normative sense of communication. It sounds true that if
Habermas does not accept Apel’s jargon of Btranscendental pragmatics^4 as Putnam
claimed, then the charge of continued discussion without negotiation can be fruitful,
and in this case, Habermas, like Apel, brought two interconnected ideas – ‘all those
affected’, i.e. ‘the widest possible community’ and ‘the truth that settled upon the
indefinitely continued discussion’. This is a way one can drop the idea of thick ethical
terms. Still, the crucial dilemma that may arise, as Putnam claimed, is that to snub thick
ethical terms in the way mentioned will undermine the application of truth as it is
defined in Apel’s jargon and also accepted by Habermas (early Habermas before the
writing of The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, 1981). In this case, the both
mentioned sides (see Putnam’s example) of the place of truth would be blocked like in
the first side; and it would be problematic to determine which action can be regarded as
chaste or which one is unchaste, as there is no valid judgment regarding the thick
ethical terms that have been accepted by the communicators (X and Y as mentioned
above). Besides, if the attempts of one of the communicators are to universalize the
maxim ‘Avoid unchaste behavior’, then all the participants have to agree about those
truths in an ideal discussion. Therefore, it would be interesting to initiate the concept of
truth by converging continued discussion under ideal conditions.
One more problem can be noticed in the conception of truth that was once portrayed
by Karl-Otto-Apel (1998). Apel’s truth theory (i.e. a minimalist account) concerns
about the agreement in the limit of indefinitely continued discussion that is based on
communicative action in the sense of normativity. This continuous discussion proce-
dure (where the verification of truths and valid judgments in ideal conditions (ideal
consensus depends on ultimate opinion) are not beyond human capabilities as they omit
negotiation for accepting social agreement) is close to anti-realism where truth relates to
human verification. Even Putnam has also changed his mind regarding his early belief
that ‘truth can be identified with Bidealized rational acceptability^’ (Putnam 2002: 124).
In our physical science and common sense, there are a lot of unverifiable facts or
judgments that do not depend on human verification or empirical understanding. Even
this may be the same for ethical judgments too. Apel aims to see the use of the
performative contradiction argument as the ‘ultimate’ base of his discourse ethics and
believes that the denying process of any rule (in discourse ethics) leads to self-
contradiction (Apel 1987: 280–281). Performative contradiction in discourse ethics
for Apel is a kind of guide that helps to identify the nominal rules of discourse ethics. A
well-known maxim that has been celebrated by the ethicists for a long-time is that
Bagents’ duties must be knowable by the agents. If they are not, then there is no need to
consider it as agents’ duties^. If we analyze this maxim in the context of the ideal
conditions of a prolonged discussion as Apel and Habermas claimed, then some
problems will arise as follows.
Putnam thinks that the definition of ideal discussion is governed in the way that the
concerning the norms and maxim of ‘discourse ethics’ would be accepted (not
4 More explicitly, a transcendental-pragmatic analysis that depends on the self-reflexive sort of presupposition-
analysis chiefly exposes that in the practice of argumentation in communicative action, the certain normative
proprieties play a pertinent role in which anybody who would like the process of all competent participants to
perform as rational evaluators ought to wish for every competent participant to identify as ideally regulating
through their discursive commitments. Here reasons are assessed by the reasonable assessors depending on the
universalistic rational ethos. (Please see, Apel 1991: 261–78)
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manipulated) by all participants in an ideal condition. Here, the question is ‘what
constitutes the justification’ and ‘how it may be possible if we accept the truth or valid
judgments as an outcome of the indefinitely prolonged discussion’. Apel answers this
question by introducing the transcendental justification that intertwines rationality and
pursues the truth. However, it is true that this intertwine procedure is considered as a
presupposed matter of ethical rationality. Even the idea of prolonged discussion of the
ethical queries sounds incorrect. There are some judgments, where a large number of
people cannot get any resolution of their arguments.
Putnam takes the case of an example, where a father’s act is considered as cruel,
because he teases his child and denies that the child’s tears are actually serious. The
father straightforwardly claims that the child ‘has to learn to take it.’ Any of two things
might happen with the father. First, he might be an obtuse/simple minded personality
who is innocently trying to make his child learn to take the tears, or, he might be a
sadist, who enjoys the pain of others. In this case, the father by engaging himself in an
act of psychological cruelty teases the child, and enjoys the child’s tears. Here, the
question arises, whether the whole community will come to an agreement that the
father’s act constitutes cruelty. There may arise a situation where a majority of the
people even shares the same obtuseness the father (might have) shared. It might happen
that people are not genuinely always bad, and they love rational arguments; accord-
ingly, they go on for endless discussions, where the participants involved do not resort
to manipulations, listen to each other, and help others for better arguments. This is
absolutely a genuine act without being aware of what discourse means. The father in
the example (and of course, most of the other people) might not even understand this
process or the implications of such a discourse. This speech situation might also turn
out well as an ‘ideal’ though the members participating in the discussion are unaware of
the requirements of an ‘ideal speech situation’ that there must be a consensus, a rational
consensus after all.
Putnam’s claim is that the discussants in the above example are not wrong in
disobeying the norms of discourse ethics, but are wrong in stating the thick ethical
terms that are particular to certain ethical problems. For Putnam, the problem arises in
using the thick ethical terms such as ‘obtuse’, ‘trace of sadism’ and so on. Here, Putnam
goes in tune with Habermas in saying that an ideal discussion is (many a times)
equivalent to the ideal of psychoanalysis, especially, when Putnam uses the scientific
sounding expression ‘a trace of sadism’. It seems to me that, considering the example, it
is difficult to determine and find out any solid agreement (by means of discourse)
whether the father is actually obtuse or a sadist. Therefore, Putnam says that using these
kinds of terms is dangerous. Hence, Putnam accepts Habermas’ psychoanalysis in case
of using these kinds of terms such as ‘obtuse’, ‘sadist’ etc.
A particular ambiguity that Putnam finds in Habermas ‘discourse ethics’ is men-
tioned here. Putnam thinks that it would be more ambiguous to consider ‘discourse
ethics’ as having an independent standing on its own, and not dependent as part of the
broader perspective of ethics. Putnam argues:
If Habermas will, as I am trying to persuade him to do, restrict the claims of
discourse ethics; if specifically, he will say that discourse ethics is a part of
ethics, a valuable and important part to be sure, but not one that can stand on its
own, not the foundation (or the foundation in Bmodernity^) of all the Bvalidity^
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that ethics can possess, then, I believe, he will be on very much the right track.
But if one attempts to defend the more ambitious claims that he and Apel have
made on behalf of discourse ethics, then either there will be no reason to believe
the claims (this will be the case if Bdiscourse ethics^ is restricted to some definite
set of norms that are supposed to characterize reason) or the claims will be empty.
For if the claim that the correct verdict in an ethical dispute will be arrived at in an
ideal speech situation just means that it will be arrived at if the disputants are
ideally morally sensitive, imaginative, impartial, and so on, then the claim is a
purely Bgrammatical^ one; it provides no content to the notion of a Bcorrect
verdict in an ethical dispute^ that that notion did not independently possess…
(Putnam 2002: 128–129)
There is another challenge, which can be posed against Habermas. One can ask
Habermas whether we can exclude the persons who are quite irrational or those who
are not eager to engage themselves in a rational discourse from the ‘all affected
persons,’ a group of persons who would like to discuss and express their arguments
not by manipulation, but to find out an agreement in favour of rational thoughts. A big
contradiction is noticed here.
4 Critiquing the Fact/Value Dichotomy
The reason for which Putnam is eager to accept Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ initially
centers around the context of entangling ‘rational thoughts’ to ‘communication’ that
Habermas proposed. Putnam does not like to accept Habermas’ thought, as, for him, a
‘valid ethical judgement’ is not able to bind all rational beings in a framework and
compels them to accept it by all persons in a prolonged discussion that is carried out by
the norms of the discourse ethics. The metaphysical idea of ‘discourse ethics’ is what
Putnam challenged in his writing by arguing against the ‘validity of the ethical judge-
ments.’ Putnam agrees with Habermas especially on the conception of informed
discussion in respect of discourse ethics etc., but he challenges the conception of
necessarily rightness or wrongness of the value concepts. The conclusion or the
decision of the affected person does not seem always right. Putnam believes that in
any rational inquiry, fallibilism takes a significant role in its methodology. The process
of knowledge does not depend always on revision. It seems true that we develop
different descriptions or new concepts and all these processes are related to language
game that goes towards new truth or it would be better to say expand language.
Therefore, a fruitful discussion always removes any sort of hierarchy or rigidity.
Therefore, Putnam attacks Habermas’ conception of rightness that is derived from the
continued discussion celebrated by all affected agents in an ideal condition (without
manipulating each other) in order to achieve a conception of necessary rightness that
will be followed by all in a society. However, I will be happy to clarify here that Putnam
firmly accepts Habermas’ aspect of rational inquiry of discourse ethics. What Putnam
attack is especially Habermas’ metaphysical idea of the validity of an ethical statement
that goes towards the truth. Putnam challenges Habermas’ idea of universal agreement,
a Kantian view. By calling it a utopia, Putnam thinks that it hardly follows that a
continuous long discussion inspires every person to an agreement. Therefore, there will
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be a lack of consensus in the case of deriving truth and justification. Habermas’
conception of consent to all can be considered as an unrealistic framework that cannot
fit with the democratic politics. In one way, we can justify Habermas’ claims regarding
universal agreement or the consent of all in his Theory of Communicative Action by
considering the ideal speech situation as a practice that one should follow. Habermas
does not hold that the rules of communication and the formal conducts that are related to
rules and present in communication help us to achieve the final truth.
Putnam mainly attacks Habermas’ idea of designing the fact/value dichotomy.
Putnam considers that this dichotomy is hostile to any fruitful inquiry. Putnam calls
this dichotomy a discussion stopper in the case of exercising rational thought in a
discourse. I think that this debate began with the query of whether moral judgements or
moral conceptions are subjective or objective. As Habermas and Rorty believe in the
subjective standpoints of value judgements, so it is easy for them to accept the
dichotomy, while Putnam rejects any ontological explanation in favour of objectivity
of ethics or subjective explanation that deals with it. He actually believes in the process
of objectivity of ethics that convince him to collapse the dichotomy of fact and value.
Rorty, as a prominent pragmatist, does not find any sense in the claim of metaphys-
ical realism that looks at objectivity as ‘things-in-themselves’. Accepting solidarity
leads Rorty to accept also the view that the agent’s words are unable to represent things
outside the agent’s skin. Putnam finds a kind of self-reputation on Rorty’s claim.
Putnam does not think that culture can determine what is true and false wholly. He
calls Rorty’s position a naive realism that hints about sociological facts and the norms
of our culture wholly determines what is true and false. Kilanowski writes:
Putnam further points out that the Rortian notion of solidarity requires exactly
what he is talking about: Bcommon sense realism about the objective existence of
the people one is in ‘solidarity’ with.^ Because of that, we should not confuse a
metaphysical notion of objectivity (that we can make sense of talk about things
Bas they are in themselves^) with the Bordinary idea that our thoughts and beliefs
refer to things in the world^.... Is it that Bwe should not^ because there are things
in the world to which we refer, or is it that we have to assume that they exist and
that this assumption is a requirement of our common sense realism? It seems that
for Putnam, the latter is correct. (Putnam 2015: 833)
The confusing matter that worries Kilanowski and I is obviously Putnam’s claim in
favour of linguistic representation of something that is located outside language. By this
argument, Putnam challenges Rorty’s position of linguistic representation within lan-
guage by vindicating the notion of the idea of common sense. If we look at Habermas
now, then we will notice that for him, values are naturalistically represented. Habermas
thinks that values are contingent social products that can be changed in regard to
different life-worlds. Putnam sees the problem in Habermas’ conception of sociology of
value. Putnam says:
It is precisely by appreciating the necessity of discourse ethics that we can
appreciate how fatal it is to Habermas’ own philosophical-political project to make
any concessions to what we might call Bsociologism about values^ – to treat value
disputes as, in effect, mere social conflicts to be resolved (although they are
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frequently that too) and not as rational disagreements calling for a decision as to
where the better reasons lie. (Putnam 2002: 121)
Putnam urges that Habermas’ account goes towards minimalist ethics by possessing a
kind of relative validity of values in a social world. Certain thick ethical terms like
cruelty, kindness, etc. are no doubt relative to some particular community. They possess
denotation, which has some formal universality. However, the problem is that the
content that involves denotation is not related to the universal. Putnam’s position is
that values in no way can discard norms unaffectedly. So, Habermas’ universal laws in
favor of ethical maxim would be challenged. Putnam thinks,
For if our ethical maxims contain thick ethical concepts – as they obviously do –
then making them into Buniversal laws^ will be problematic in any view accord-
ing to which what the extensions of those ethical concepts are is a question that
has no universally intelligible answer. (Putnam 2002: 120)
Putnam’s denial of the fact/value dichotomy eventually articulates a solid human
concern or a concern about the world/objectivity where values cannot be considered
as mere expressions of agent’s emotions but as a package of the real world. The collapse
of fact/value enhancement is a celebrated plea that underlines humanistic vision of
flourishing human reasoning with some significant content that tends toward the world
of facts. The exact description of the epistemic values intends us Bcloser to truth about
the world^. Putnam’s conception on ‘ethics with content’ fortify the claims that we can
get a thick ethical concept only when we locate a liaison between the concept and the
ethical point of view that is associated with the use of the concept. To understand the
procedure we have to see language as a whole (language as a social art), not as an innate
faculty. Ethics in a deeper sense is related to moral language that infuses the fact/value
entanglement. The factual description and valuation cannot be conceived in segregation
from each other as any description effectively engages valuation.
Putnam argues that if we accept Habermas and Rorty’s conception of solidarity and
subjectivity regarding any maxims (like ‘don’t be cruel’) that, according to them, is
associated with social products and differs from community to community, then the
maxim cannot achieve any universal valid agreement. In searching for better judge-
ments or valid arguments in discourse ethics, Habermas has to maintain that the
arguments need to be present and approved by the social world where fallibility of
knowledge does not get any value as the discussion tries to defend the correct answer
with a better judgement of the agent (i.e. rational discussants). Putnam thinks that the
purpose would be fulfilled if Habermas accepts objectivity in his discourse ethics. He
firmly believes that objectivity has allied to universal values that represent some
commonsensical notion. It would be interesting to argue that the thick ethical terms
that Putnam mentioned have some denotation in a particular community. Similarly, this
reason has a formal universal stance. Habermas may agree with the discussion by
saying that in his discourse ethics, he focuses on the rules of communication and is not
interested about mere rules that intends towards correct answers. Two Habermasian
ways to see Bwords^ as having a relative denotation that interconnects with the
particular community have some roots in a particular language in our social world. I
think that this process cannot pursue any hostility regarding the agreement of a
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continuing discussion of the rational agent. Putnam argues against Habermas, especial-
ly, on the conception of the formal rules that, for him, cannot mingle with the correct
verdict. He argues that if we consider a situation where the disputants have the quality
of impartial ideally morally sensible etc. (even if they agree to the correct verdict) then
the whole process according to Putnam becomes a grammatical one. Commenting on
Putnam’s stance Kilanowski rightly emphasises:
As Putnam claims Kantian ethics, as well as discourse ethics are empty formalism
– they are empty and formal unless we supply them with content from Levinasian
and Aristotelian thought, and concerns with democracy, toleration or pluralism.
In other words, the notion of an Bideal speech situation^ is, for Putnam, empty
due to the absence of thick ethical concepts. (Kilanowski 2015: 837)
One point needs to be clarified here is that, in Habermas’ ethical discourse, the content
of ethical discussion, along with the formal rules of conduct, is no doubt value centric.
And the communication procedure has some shared paradigm, as it is common to all
agents. So, Habermasian process accepts values that are ethically aligned. The basic
problem of Habermas’ thesis, according to Putnam, is how it would be possible to
gather different parties and involve them to continue a discussion towards an agreement
without manipulating each other. If we admit that a large number of people in a
community follow some formal conducts for moving towards an agreement depending
on the communicative action procedures, then the other group of people in the same
community can challenge the content of the formal conduct or rules. Habermas may
reply that in discourse ethics, an articulation have no place. However, that does not
show that this marginalized people are out of society, and that they are not affected by
the agreement that comes from the continuous discussion of the rational agents.
However, Habermas clarifies that the rational discussants do not have any attitude to
manipulate the other, as the main norm in communicative action is to defend moral
values by recognizing the other people as an end, and in no means, one can treat the
other as a means. Following the Kantian principle, Habermas introduces an additional
value in his discourse ethics that is often called the value of a human being.
5 Way Out
Let me revisit Putnam’s magnificent stand as to why he introduces the thick ethical
terms in his ethics. The chief ambition of Putnam is to collapse the dichotomy between
fact and values. As he considers that this dichotomy offers a subjective preference,
Putnam considers that we always impose the norms and laws on us to provide it a
universal stand by entangling with moral values or we can say in particular the thick
ethical terms like sensitive, kind, cruel, etc., He firmly believes that the vocabulary of
norms would be meaningless if there is no human manifold of values. In Ethics without
Ontology, Putnam writes, ‘... ethics and mathematics can and do possess objectivity
without being about sublime or intangible objects such as ‘Platonic forms’ or ‘abstract
entities^... (Putnam 2004: 2).
Putnam discards any kind of priority based moral values. His position is close to
moral realism that tries to neglect any kind of final set of moral truths that is construed
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by rigid morality, although Putnam suggests that the latter Habermas changes his mind
and believes in the idea that some values are objective. Kilanowski clarifies:
Habermas admitted in reply to Putnam’s comments, as Putnam mentions that the
objective validity of Kantian Bnorms^ presupposes the objective applicability of
the value terms that this norm contain. But the problem is that Habermas
considers only some values as subjective – universalizable values. There are
others that he considers merely subjective to individual or group projects – they
are non universalizable values, which are not prohibited by a valid Bnorm^.
(Kilanowski 2015: 839)
Though it sounds from Putnam’s writing that Putnam rebuffs any sort of principle of
universalizability as he does not think that there may be some point where everyone
will agree, his approach to capabilities theory can accept the universalizability princi-
ple. But it is true that there are no justified grounds to prove this argument. The
fondness of objectivity inspired him to see common sense realism, and in this process,
he offers a warranted assertibility hypothesis that tries to judge the right/wrong and
truth/falsity of the statements. To determine truth is no doubt one of the biggest
challenges of the philosophical theories. Even in ethics, one may be concerned about
the truth-value of ethical judgements. Putnam considers that one can be a good moral
realist in determining the value judgement by discarding transcendent facts to ensure
the role of objective facts that hold moral values. Putnam writes that we need no better
ground for treating ‘value judgements as capable of truth and falsity than the fact that
we can and do treat them as capable of warranted assertability and warranted
deniability’. (Putnam 2002: 110).
To find out a superior resolution, Putnam does not believe a single criterion that
could judge the warranted assertability in any ethical judgement. Like Wittgenstein,
Putnam has also a fascination to think that a judgement could turn out right only if the
community bestows their agreement with it. For Putnam, truth is not only a shared
paradigm of our community that is culturally relative and determined by the warranted
assertability. Truth is actually the objective fact that is related to reality. To flourish this
argument, he takes different concerns together with his ethical approach like the
Aristotelian concern, the talks about human ability, and Kantian aspects of the good
life and treatment of human beings as an end, even he was close to Habermas and Rorty
regarding the maxim of responsible use of human freedom.
The most elegant point that needs attention here is obviously whether Putnam rightly
believes in Rorty’s jargon, according to which, an agent could not stand outside of her/
his thoughts and concepts as reality resides in it. In Word and Life, as an externalist,
Putnam presents his opinion against Rorty by saying:
In starting [the argument of Rorty’s that I just criticized], I said that it is
impossible to stand outside and compare our thought and language, on the one
hand, with the world on the other; and, indeed this is the way in which Rorty puts
matters. But if we agree that it is unintelligible to say, ‘We sometimes succeed in
comparing language and thought with reality as it is in itself’, then we should
realize that it is also unintelligible to say, ‘It is impossible to stand outside and
compare our thought and language with the world’... (Putnam 1994: 299)
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These lines perfectly point out that Putnam had no belief in Rorty’s argument in favour
of the subjective representation of morality cum reality. The very impressive point that
Putnam raised against Rorty and Habermas who believe in the subjective representation
of morality is that the non-commonsensical view on our language may present a direct
contact with reality (as much as possible) seems like a rambling argument. The facility
only comes when we formulate it in a procedure of piecemeal that touches with the
distinct constituents of reality. Putnam worries about the thought that to accept the
piecemeal process regarding the relation between words and the world has a propensity
to represent that kicking the object absorbs the particular object; but in the case of
description, it cannot involve the particular object at all. Now, the question is why
Putnam alters his opinion against subjectivity and takes a stand in favour of objectivity.
He does not believe in commonsensical representation of the objective values. The
reason in Putnam’s own words:
In fact, I have never claimed that the objectivity or universality of values
(objectivity and universality are not the same thing, by the way!), or of truths
about any other subject matter, Brests on^ the notion of representation. believe
that many, many different sorts of statements are objectively true; am I supposed
to believe that all of these different sorts of truth Brest on^ the semantical claim
that there is a relation of representation (more, precisely, of reference, or, to use
Tarski’s term for the converse of the reference relation, a relation of
Bsatisfaction^) between terms and particular entities, ordered pairs of entities,
ordered triples of entities, and so on. (Putnam 2015: 853)
We find a quite similar opinion in Akeel Bilgrami’s writing who believes that fact
contains value in a mind-independent sense. Bilgrami in his well-known paper ‘The
Visibility of Value?’ (2016) mainly disenchanted the philosophical outlook of value
from any metanormative sense. According to the sentimentalist (David Hume and
Adam Smith) views, values are human disposition that has a causal link to the world.
The extension of this trend quests for mind-dependence value, a thesis that brings about
the conception of psychological reliance value being not related to the objective sense.
Bilgrami argues:
One can have both these perspectives (engaged and detached) on oneself, but not
at the same time. In other words, one cannot at the same time both intend and
predict that one will do something. The one perspective crowds the other
perspective out. Moreover, and more importantly, unless one had an engaged
perspective on oneself, one would not be a practical agent. (Bilgrami 2016: 925)
This approach shows that intention crowded out prediction. One cannot intend and
predict the same thing to do at a same time. If you think that you will intend to do a
particular thing, then in the same time, you cannot predict that someone will do it for
you. The point that Bilgrami appreciates is an intention that directly brings about the
action. Similarly, the desire of an agent represents what is the enviable object in the
world. Bilgrami holds that if one recognizes agency in terms amiable to the mind-
dependence of value, then the question of agency will become extraneous. Here we can
mislay the explanandum. Mind-dependence cannot portrait what is called agency.
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Mind-independence values commence with the sense of objective world that is a
fundamental criterion of objectivity. It seems to me pertinent that the content of one’s
thought is metaphysically distinct from the referent of the thought. The conception of
action tends towards objectivity, not to the psychological states of mind. Actions
basically intend to value (in an objective sense), not to the method of valuing (it sounds
more psychological). The consensus of mind-dependence value is a paradox. Bilgrami
writes:
Desires in us are nothing if there are no desirabilities (and undesirabilities) or
values (and disvalues) in the world as well. And our agency consists in the fact
that these desirabilities or values in the world make normative demands on us
that trigger our desires upon which we act, as (practical) agents. And the
challenge that views desires as self-standing simply denies this, claiming
instead that agency consists merely in acting on our desires and those desires
do not answer to any external calling of desirabilities or values in the world.
(Bilgrami 2016: 929)
Habermas, in his article, ‘Reconciliation through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on
John Rawls,’ (1995) makes a very comprehensible and lucid distinction between norms
and values. The essential features of norms are that they are normative in nature. Norms
cope with what one ought to do. A norm is said to be either valid or invalid in
Habermasian sense, especially because here the validity claim is determined on the
basis of how rationally it has been formed in a universal discourse. Since norms are
formed out of a universal discourse, they are absolutely universal and unconditional,
according to Habermas. On the other hand, values guide us as to what conduct is
desirable and what is not. Values carry an evaluative meaning. It is because values
involve a preference/choice of a particular thing/good/action, because the desirability of
a particular value may vary from one culture to another, from one group to another.
If we remember Habermas’ hypothesis, then we will see that, in determining the
truth-value of moral judgements, objectivity plays no role. Here, the important thing is
that in a continued discussion, a particular community’s rational members would like to
determine their value that satisfies the norms of ‘discourse ethics’. Habermas claims:
Norms inform decisions as to what one ought to do, values inform decisions as to
what conduct is desirable. . . Norms raise a binary validity claim in virtue of
which they are said to be either valid or invalid. . .Values, by contrast, fix relations
of preference that signify that certain goods are more attractive than others; hence,
we can assent to evaluative statements to a greater or lesser degree. The oblig-
atory force of norms has the absolute meaning of an unconditional and universal
duty. . . The attractiveness of values reflects on evaluation and a transitive
ordering of goods that has become established in particular cultures or has been
adopted by particular groups. (Habermas 1995: 114–115)
In The Collapse of Fact/Value Dichotomy, the promising question that Putnam deci-
phers is nothing but the inextricable entanglement between the normative and
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descriptive content; especially, in the case of value terms like the cruel or psychological
cruelty, etc. Putnam thinks that a father who teased his baby to cry by claiming that ‘He
has to learn to take it’, can be considered in Habermas’ sense as a psychological cruelty,
which as a judgement has value. Now what the father did (‘psychological cruelty’) with
his child cannot be regarded as ‘cruelty’ only if, in his particular culture, it becomes
permissible. In this case, for the general people like us, it would look like an ethno-
centric model. Most of the cultures dislike and does not permit to ‘use cruel method to
children’, but Putnam finds a problem in the method of ‘using cruelty’ to the children
that differ from one culture to another. We will be unable to find out any objective
content if we articulate the ‘universal value’ of the judgment like ‘Don’t use cruel
methods to children’. The second interesting criticism that Putnam raised against
Habermas is that if Habermas accepts the ‘psychological cruelty’ of the father to his
child as a sort of value judgment that can be objectively right, then the value judgement
will not achieve any ‘universal norm’ standard. It obviously would be a
nonuniversaliazable value whose validity and acceptance precisely depend on the
particular culture. So, here, the dilemma that retrieves the objection that Putnam argued
mainly concerns about the procedure of intending to resolve the extension of each value
term not only depending on the Buniversalizable^ values possessing, but also upon the
conception of culture-relative Bvalidity .^ Putnam himself clarifies, ‘I also said that the
idea that the non-universalizable values possess only culture-relative validity is unac-
ceptable ethically.’ (Putnam 2015: 859).
This is one of the standard claims that insist on a universalizable pattern of
culture-relative value and I agree with Putnam that an expression of fact/value
dichotomy involves as a normative stance, besides the epistemic values having
inseparably entangled with the formation of factual discourse that intends
towards collapsing the fact/value dichotomy, a subjective universalizability
predilection.
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